



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

# P R E F A C E.

---

The completion of this volume furnishes the appropriate occasion for a rapid review of the contents of the Journal from its first number to the eighth, which closes the second volume. By such review the compass and relation of the articles presented may best be seen.

The ancients divided Philosophy into three departments,

- (a) DIALECTICS,
- (b) PHYSICS,
- (c) ETHICS,

these departments corresponding to what we in modern times call (a) Pure Philosophy or Logic, (b) Philosophy of Nature, (c) Philosophy of Spirit. We propose to arrange the articles of this volume so as to show clearly what has been given in each of these departments:

## *Pure Philosophy.*

1. Mr. Kroeger has contributed two introductions to the "Science of Knowledge" by Fichte, and the "Sun-clear Statement concerning the True Nature of the Science of Knowledge" by that philosopher; these contributions occupying in all some eighty-seven pages of the Journal, and running through six numbers. In these, one will find the clearest and most forcible exposition of the Kantian and Fichtean standpoint. Taken in connection with the translation of the Science of Knowledge itself, published by Mr. Kroeger last year, and Fichte's second exposition of that science which will appear in the third

volume of this Journal, we trust that nothing is wanting to the complete equipment of the student who desires to understand Fichte, unless it be a vigorous commentary by some American student who has already mastered the system.

2. Leibnitz's *Monadology* has been given for the first time in English. This famous compend of the system of that great man gives in its pure outlines the science of the IDEA, in the highest sense of that term. It stands as the representation of a system of thought which "thinks by wholes"—as the Neo-Platonists term it—a system of thought which ascends above all mere abstractions, and thinks true individuality under the form of the *Monad*. Not the *Atom*, but the *MONAD*; for the "atom" denotes the simple element of matter—a figment of materialistic abstract theorizing—while the "monad" is the self-contained, independent, simple existence which by its own activity *re-presents* the universe in itself. It is the *Microcosm*.

3. In the Introduction to Philosophy the editor has endeavored to present various important *aperçus* that belong to the department of Pure Philosophy. In other articles he has followed out the same purpose to some extent: "The Speculative," the critique of "Paul Janet and Hegel," and of "Herbert Spencer." Then some discussions resulting from these, as "Nominalism *vs.* Realism," &c., belong to the treatment of the same subject. In all, about sixty-four pages of the two volumes are occupied in this way.

4. Schelling's "Introduction to Idealism" gives, in a lucid exposition, his view of the problems of pure thought. If read in connection with his "Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature," translated, like the former, by Mr. Davidson, a tolerably clear conception of the system of Schelling may be reached.

5. Many passages in the treatment of the Phenomenology of Spirit bear on this subject: as pure science is not only *presupposed* in all applied science, but is actually introduced into all thorough expositions.

In all, about one-third of the pages of the Journal have been devoted to Pure Philosophy or Dialectics.

#### *Philosophy of Nature.*

A few articles treat of this in whole or in part. They are

1. "Goethe's Theory of Colors."
2. "Metaphysics of Materialism."
3. Schelling's "Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature."
4. Leibnitz "On the Nature of the Soul in Brutes, &c."
5. "Herbert Spencer."
6. Alcott's "Genesis."

In all, perhaps one-eighth of the work has had this bearing.

#### *Philosophy of Spirit.*

This general head includes, besides others, Psychological and Æsthetic articles, and for convenience will be divided.

##### A. Psychology.

1. The contributions of Mr. Peirce on the "Faculties claimed for Man," "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," "Validity of the Laws of Logic," starting from a Psychological basis, have an important bearing on the problems of Pure Science.

2. Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit," with the Analysis of the same, traces the phases of experience through which the mind passes in its endeavor to complete its comprehension of truth. Strictly considered, Phenomenology and Psychology should be distinguished one from the other, Psychology referring to the faculties of mind as coördinated, while Phenomenology treats of the phases of the culture of mind as successive.

3. Schopenhauer's "Dialogue on Immortality" and "Doctrine of the Will" give sufficient clue to the discerning reader to show the drift of the entire system of that distinguished man.

4. "Sāṅkhya Kārikā" of Kapila: The entire Philosophy of Spirit as treated thousands of years ago by a Brahmin. The freeing of man from external constraint through the activity of thought is opposed to other solutions—such as that which is prescribed by the Vedas.

5. "Cousin's Doctrine of the Absolute" develops the relations of Cousin to Kant and gives the psychological grounds of his system.

In all, about eighty pages are occupied with this subject.

##### B. Æsthetics.

The departments of Art are five in number: Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music, and Poetry, including art-works of Literature under the latter subdivision.

I. The Analysis of Hegel's Æsthetics by Bénard, which has been continued through six numbers of the Journal, has given a general view of Art, and its different styles and phases. It constitutes a complete outline of the Philosophy of Art.

The portions relating to Architecture, Sculpture, Painting and Music have been given, and the more elaborate analysis of the treatment of Poetry will be printed in the third volume.

II. Besides the general treatment contained in Bénard's Analysis, different departments have been illustrated by special articles.

1. *Sculpture*: Winckelmann's Remarks on the Torso and the Laökoön; Goethe's Essay on the Laökoön; these genial interpretations are examples of the best that has been written in the whole domain of art-criticism.

2. *Painting*: Goethe's Essay on Leonardo da Vinci's "Last Supper," and "Raphael's Transfiguration."

3. *Music*: "Dialogue on Music;" "New School of Music;" "Beethoven's Seventh Symphony;" "Music as a form of Art;" Beethoven's Sinfonia Eroica; these articles show by example what contents musical works of art may have, and, more or less, they develop the theoretic limitations of the art.

4. *Poetry*: "Notes on Milton's Lycidas;" two series of "Letters on Faust;" "A Thought on Shakespeare;" Rosenkranz on "Goethe's Social Romances," treating Wilhelm Meister, the Elective Affinities, &c., and besides this his famous critique on the second part of Faust.

So large a portion has been devoted to the

exposition of Art for the reason that its sensuous content acts most readily upon the incipient phases of culture, and its higher forms work with a genial effect in developing the spiritual faculties.

Art is moreover a subject for free reflection, while Religion has not as yet become such among us. The constraint prevailing in the latter province seriously hinders the pure thinking that is requisite to see the speculative depth of the great ideas that underlie the religion of the day, while those who break away from the popular forms fall into an abyss of nullification such as unfits them for sound positive insight. They wander away from all the landmarks that Spirit has been setting up for two thousand years, and soon find themselves in an attitude of hostility to all the forms and institutions of the age in which they live—all except the most superficial. And yet they find themselves obliged to live a contradiction, for they cannot renounce these institutions practically without committing suicide. Intellectual “clearing-up”—insight—alone can work out for the individual the emancipation which our time demands. To preach renunciation of the convictions arrived at by the activity of reflection is to recommend a suicide worse than that into which those plunge who reject all guidance except their own caprice. The doctrine of Herbert Spencer, that the cardinal point in religion is the confession that the Absolute is unknowable, leads directly to the conclusion: let us have done, then, with all talk about what we can know nothing of—let us leave religion to the past—to the mythologizing age of humanity, and give our whole attention to the sphere of natural science, the Positive. Hamilton and Mansell cannot with consistency say nay to this conclusion.

It is evident that any form of activity of mind which involves a union of feeling and intellect must owe to the latter factor all the content it may have. Parental love, for example, cannot be exerted toward a definite object unless the intellect recognizes in that object its relation to the subject of that love. A brute deprived of the senses whereby it can distinguish its own from other offspring would cherish all alike, and if it could not distinguish the young of its own kind from those of different species, its love would extend to the latter. So of religious feeling, and with far more force, may

this be said, for the intelligence of the subject is here so important that without its ascendancy the form of its action contradicts all that religion should attain. Fetichism, wherein the subject has not distinguished as yet the limits of his own personality, nor obtained any clearness regarding the difference between things and self-determining beings—and whose consciousness, therefore, is a dreamy haze, a life of instinct, a mesmeric intoxication half *en rapport* with the pulses of nature and half a fitful waking to consciousness of self—fetichism is the nadir of Religion, and shows what Religion must be with the minimum of intellect. It does not matter what form of religion one teaches to a people buried in this stage—*provided the intellectual side be ignored*—for such a people will receive any form as no more than a fetichism and are powerless to make it otherwise. So of Religions which though Pagan are far higher in the scale than mere fetichism;—take Buddhism, for example: were the Christian missionary to convert a Buddhist people to Christianity, and at the same time leave the intellectual mode of viewing things as it was before, he would find that the Christian doctrines had only been substituted in name for those renounced. The story of the missionary, who, in conveying to the savages an idea of immortality, was obliged, on account of the utter want of words containing spiritual import in the language, to teach them that each individual had within him an entrail that never decayed, illustrates this point.

All spiritual culture rises step by step through a cancelling of sensuous facts or of the limits which bound sensuous perception. Thus the first abstract or general idea is a contradiction of the sensuous certitude and involves this absurdity (to the senses), that somewhat should be what it is not—i. e. that a somewhat should have its essence in what exists as other (or alien) to it—a point well shown in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (chapter on “This and the Meaning.”) So all higher concepts are reached through downright contradiction of the lower “common sense view.” Thus the idea of immortality above spoken of had to be taught simply as a physical absurdity at first. Out of that contradiction arises the abstracted and freer thought of the doctrine. So religion throughout moves in a cycle of super-sensuous-sensuousness—a series of types

that shadow forth with more or less clearness the eternal verity of the universe and at the same time use material types to do it with. The material facts which answer the purpose of typifying spiritual truths are used in a contradictory sense. The phantasy of the believer who appropriates these is thereby loosened from the enthrallment of the merely natural, and this enthrallment being broken, all spiritual possibilities at once open for the soul.

That this first enfranchisement of the soul begins through the Phantasy is to be remembered in order rightly to understand the function of art in a civilization. Then to trace this back into the Mythology and thenceforward into the forms and observances of the system of worship is the next step. Sometimes these mythological types ascend and at others they descend. The myth of Thor's Journey to Utgard and victory over the Giants (untamed natural forces) lifted the Scandinavian consciousness out of its every-day prose reality to such a height that deeds of almost miraculous valor were performed. The same myth subordinated by degrees finally becomes the story of Jack the Giant Killer, and still acts most powerfully upon the phantasy of the child in the nursery, and no one can tell to what mechanical inventions it has contributed the first impulse, or what more spiritual achievements it has prompted.

"Truth embodied in a tale,  
Shall enter in at lowly doors,"

and after the Phantasy has seized the intellectual content the clear conception follows, and therewith the complete elevation of the mind out of the previous stage of Consciousness. Thus the religious process commences in the natural and instinctive—the element of feeling—and proceeds toward the clear thought, passing through the stage of Phantasy. Thus Religion is the great Nursery of human spirit, and no culture, no ascendancy above the immediateness of animal life has ever taken, or can take, place except through religion. Those who grow up in modern society and call themselves atheists or infidels, owe, all the same, whatever insight they may possess, to religious training—the only difficulty being for them to recognize the same. For when one lives and breathes an element, it is not easy to separate himself from it so far as to distinguish clearly its outlines, and hence he is apt to

mistake some special form of its manifestation for it. As, for example, one may mistake the men filling the offices of the state for the state itself, and hold likely enough that the state is a very unimportant affair; forgetting meanwhile that in our modern state very little of its essence is embodied in the officers who have the name of administering it, but that its essence is all the more embodied in the individuals who constitute society, so that little is left for the external visible government to do. But were the organism of the state removed—whose essential function is to secure to each man the fruition of his deed, good or bad—the individual deprived thus of the organism which elevated him to such importance as individual, would shrivel up into an atom so insignificant that life would not be worth the having. Thus in the common attitude of the individual toward the state there is quite as much unconscious as conscious relation. No doubt so long as this unconsciousness remains there will arise collisions, and that too of a bloody character. So in Religion the unconscious element, that which the mere sentiment enshrouds, must be productive of collisions, while it impels ever onward toward the self-clearness of pure thought. It is for those who hold by the form as well as the substance of religion to penetrate by careful study the causes of these collisions, and thus get into a position to administer the remedy. And that remedy is LIGHT. No truly religious man would admit that his religion contained aught but the absolute truth. This absolute truth, embodied in such a form as to be *lived and felt* as religion, should also be *thought* as pure truth. The Piety of the Heart leads its possessor to renounce whatever comes between him and the divine mission of his life; the Piety of the Intellect leads to the renunciation of mere opinions, the delusions of the senses—to a seeking, through a speculative insight, the Truth which burns with a consuming fire the shreds of abstraction and stands before the soul in wholeness and holiness.

To attempt to solve the problem of scepticism through an exhortation addressed to the sceptic to give up searching for comprehension, is to preach a one-sided Christianity which ignores the highest attribute of man and seeks to elevate the emotional nature over the rational—a procedure that would end in fetichism if persisted in. That which

proceeds from error of the intellect should be corrected intellectually and not emotionally. Indeed since the intellect furnishes the content for the emotions the latter procedure is impossible, and an attempt to carry it out results only in making a wide breach between the scientific and the religious consciousness.

But it must be confessed that the hostility of Religion to Philosophy does not make much headway except as it is reinforced by weapons from the armory of Philosophy itself. It is to negative, sceptical philosophers, like Kant, Hamilton, and Mansell, that theologians go for arguments to prove the impotency of the human intellect in the pursuit of truth. The great Christian fathers and the theologians that have ap-

peared from time to time in the history of the Church have vindicated the claims of Reason in Religion by showing the speculative depth of the dogmas that form the system of faith.

Scepticism in Philosophy turns for the most part on one of three points. The transition from the sensuous grade of thinking to the freer reflection and the absolutely free movement of speculative thought, encounters—1st, the problem of the Infinite Progress; 2d, that of Essence and Phenomenon; 3d, that of Subjective and Objective, i. e. form of thought and “thing-in-itself.”

The discussion of these problems has formed the theme of much that has been in the Journal, and will be made the subject of a special article in the next volume.